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Ownership Rights to Submerged and
Formerly Submerged Land in New Jersey
I. Introduction
It is the settled law of this country that the ownership of
and dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by tidewaters,
within the limits of the several states, belong to the respective
States within which they are found, with the consequent right to
use or dispose of any portion thereof, when that can be done
without substantial impairment of the interest of the public in
the waters, and subject always to the paramount right of Con-
gress to control their navigation so far as may be necessary for
the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and among the
States.'
If one has any doubt as to whether there is a crisis in New
Jersey coastal property ownership, talk to Nancy Uber. In order to
obtain clear title on her plot of land in Lavallette, Ms. Uber, a re-
tired school teacher, was required to pay $27,290 to the state of New
Jersey for a part of her property which was found to have been for-
merly submerged by the waters of Barnegat Bay.' Uber was a victim
of the public trust doctrine3 which declares that the state owns title
to all lands that are now or once were tide-flowed. She is by no
means the only property owner subject to a state claim on her land.5
Many homeowners living along the New Jersey coastline are discov-
ering to their dismay that land they thought they owned in fee sim-
ple is, in fact, partly or wholly owned by the state." This forces the
property holders to "re-buy" land upon which they have been living
and paying taxes for years. State officials express regret over the fact
1. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892).
2. Phila. Inquirer, Oct. 5, 1986, at 10A, col. I.
3. "Put in its simplest terms, the public trust doctrine is the state ownership of all pres-
ently and formerly tide flowed lands up to the high-water mark, subject to an irrevocable trust
for the common benefit of all people of the state." New Jersey Sports and Education Auth. v.
McCrane, 61 N.J. 1, 67, 292 A.2d 545, 579 (1972).
4. Tide flowed land is that land which falls between the high and low ebb of the tide.
See infra note 91.
5. Bill Schwartz, a property owner in Bayville, had a tenth of an acre plot of land as-
sessed at $5950. Ralph Greico of Spring Lake had a 0.29 acre parcel priced at $73,500 to
clear title. In order to remove the state's claim to the property, the deed holder must buy the
land from the state. In some posh coastal neighborhoods land may sell for as much as one
million dollars an acre. Phila. Inquirer, Oct. 5, 1986, at 10A, col. 6.
6. Maps indicate that tens of thousands of acres along the coastline are filled tideland
never purchased from the state. Id. at 10A, col. 1.
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that innocent citizens are suffering financially, but insist that state
law and the New Jersey Constitution prohibit them from relinquish-
ing without compensation the state's claim to the lands. 7 Unconsoled
by the sympathy of the state, many homeowners feel bewildered and
angered about a predicament which they perceive to be unfair and
illogical. Nancy Uber's remark reflects the coastal homeowners' out-
raged feelings: "The state comes along and says, 'Well, once in a
blue moon water flowed over your property, so we own it.' Well, 100
million years ago wasn't everything under water?"" The state and
the homeowners are indeed caught between the devil and the deep
blue sea. The state owns the land by virtue of the public trust doc-
trine,9 and merely to grant the land gratis would impair the integrity
of the doctrine. Furthermore, the state views itself as required by
statute1" and constitutional amendment"1 to charge fair market value
because the land is held in trust for the benefit of the Fund for Sup-
port of Free Public Schools. David F. Moore, Chairman of the Tide-
lands Council,' 2 remarks, "We are out there to protect the interests
of the people of New Jersey.''1
This comment first examines the public trust doctrine in order
to determine the historical and intellectual underpinnings of the law
which requires innocent landholders to rebuy their land from the
state. After a brief description of the public trust doctrine in an his-
torical context, attention will be turned to the development of the
doctrine in New Jersey courts. Special inquiry will be made into
New Jersey's attempts to deal equitably with the problem of riparian
land ownership. Additional scrutiny is focused upon the important
1967 New Jersey Supreme Court decision of O'Neill v. State High-
way Department,' and the muddled, litigious state of affairs that
has followed in its wake. The comment proposes that, in order to
preserve the integrity of the public trust in tidal areas, to protect the
legitimate interests of the Fund for Support of Free Public Schools,
and to deliver an equitable result to coastal property owners, certain
modifications need to be made in the state's policy toward asserting
7. David F. Moore, Chairman of the Tideland Council, remarked, "I feel badly. I think
everyone on the Council does. We're not a bunch of people out there to cause other people
mental anguish." Id. at 10A, col. 3.
8. Id. at 10A, col. 2.
9. See McCrane, 61 N.J. 1, 292 A.2d 545 (1972); supra note 3 and accompanying text.
10. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:56-5 (West 1968).
11. N.J. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 4, 2.
12. The Tidelands Council is the state organization which administers the tidelands.
13. Phila. Inquirer, Oct. 5, 1986, at 10A, col. 3.
14. 50 N.J. 307, 235 A.2d I (1967).
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its rights in public trust land. These modifications are: broadening
the policy of estoppel against the state; and providing greater dis-
counts to those bona fide purchasers who still must buy their land
from the state in order to clear title. As will be shown, there is ample
precedent to support both modifications. These changes will help in-
nocent bona fide purchasers without either distorting the public trust
doctrine or placing too large a burden on the state and its fund for
public schools.
The public trust doctrine centers on two key issues. First, what
interests are protected by the doctrine? Second, what is the state's
proper role in promoting and preserving public trust property? The
reader's reaction to these two aspects of the public trust doctrine will
likely determine his attitude toward the dilemma now faced by
Nancy Uber and many other coastal property owners.
II. A Background of the Public Trust Doctrine
The public trust doctrine has been traced to Roman law, which
held that "by the law of nature, these things are common to man-
kind: the air, running water, the sea and consequently the shores of
the sea." 15 This Latin concept of public ownership (res communis)
of tidal areas reached a low ebb during the Middle Ages, as the
lords of fragmented feudal principalities claimed tidal zones as their
own personal property. 16 Insofar as English law is concerned, the
Magna Carta has been seen, in part, as a restoration of the owner-
ship of English riverbeds and tidal areas in the public.' Regardless
15. JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES, 2.1.1, quoted in National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court,
33 Cal.3d 419, 433, 658 P.2d 709, 718, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 355 (1983).
16. H. SCHULTES, AQUATIC RIGHTS 6 (1839). However, not all analyses perceive the
dark ages as being the low point of the public trust doctrine. Joseph L. Sax, an unabashed
public trust proponent, finds the doctrine surviving even in the Middle Ages through the medi-
eval tradition of the commons. He cited M. BLOCH. FRENCH RURAL HISTORY 183 (1966) for a
statement of French law in the I lth century: "[T]he running water and springs, meadows,
pastures, forests, heaths and rocks . . . are not to be held by the lord . . . nor are they to be
maintained ... in any other way than that their people may always be able to use them."
Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C.D. L. REV.
185, 189 (1980).
17. Chief Justice Kirkpatrick concluded in Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821), the
leading New Jersey public trust case, that the taking of common property by the Norman
kings was improper and that the Magna Carta revived traditional notions of common owner-
ship of public lands. It is not altogether certain, however, that the king could not grant tidal
lands. See Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas; A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doc-
trine, 79 YALE L.J. 762 (1970). Notwithstanding its inaccuracy, Chief Justice Kirkpatrick's
historical interpretation was accepted by no less an authority than Chief Justice Taney. In
Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, the original United States Supreme Court case concerning the
public trust, Chief Justice Taney wrote: "The question is not free from doubt and the authori-
ties referred to in the English books cannot, perhaps, be altogether reconciled. But ...the
question must be regarded as settled in England against the right of the King since Magna
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of the historical genesis of the public trust theory,1" there can be
little doubt that the doctrine has a long history and a continuing
viability in American jurisprudence.
The leading early American case enunciating the public trust
doctrine is from the New Jersey Supreme Court. This is hardly sur-
prising given the state's topography. Situated on the Atlantic Ocean
and the Delaware and New York Bays, the state's geography in-
cludes a multitude of rivers and tributaries which form long shore-
lines and concomitant large tracts of tidal lands.19 In Arnold v.
Mundy,20 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the English prin-
ciple, supposedly derived from the Magna Carta, that tidal land be-
longed to the sovereign in trust for the public would apply under
American law. Following the American Revolution, therefore, tidal
land passed to the states.2 1 The court traced the public trust in tidal
lands as it passed from Charles II to his brother the Duke of York
when the king granted territories including New Jersey to the Duke
in 1664.2 From there the court followed the trust as it existed after
the Duke granted New Jersey (then known as Nova Caesaria) to the
proprietors Lord Berkeley and Sir George Carteret.2 3 By the grant of
Charles II to the Duke of York, the rivers, ports, bays, and coasts
passed to the Duke in the same form as the crown's ownership. Thus,
the proprietors under grant from the Duke did not take a property
Carta to make such a grant." Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842).
18. For a more thorough treatment of the historical development of the doctrine, see
generally CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS (1967); Jaffe, State Citizens Rights Respect-
ing Greatwater Resource Allocation: From Rome to New Jersey, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 571
(1971) (an article for the real riparian rights enthusiast); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473 (1970) (written
by a strong proponent of the doctrine); The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law
and Management: A Symposium, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. (1980) (a discussion of public trust devel-
opments in California); Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas; A Sometime Submerged
Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762 (1970).
19. Although the New Jersey coastline is only 130 miles long, the shoreline (measured
by the outer coast, offshore islands, sounds, bays, rivers, and creeks included to the head of
tidewater or to a point where tidal waters narrow to less than 100 feet) is 1,792 miles long.
THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 433 (1984).
20. 6 N.J.L. I (Sup. Ct. 1821).
21. Chief Justice Kirkpatrick wrote: "[U]pon the Revolution, all these royal rights be-
came vested in the people of New Jersey as the sovereign of the country . . . and that they
having themselves both the legal title and the usufruct may make such disposition of them,
and such regulation concerning them as they may think fit." Id. at 78.
22. For a complete history of New Jersey as a colony see SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COL-
ONY OF NOVA-CAESARIEA NEW JERSEY (1877). For a history of the state and that history's
relation to the public trust, see Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842);
Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. I, 15-22 (Sup. Ct. 1821); Schultz v. Wilson, 44 N.J. Super. 591,
596, 131 A.2d 415, 421 (1957), cert. denied 24 N.J. 546, 133 A.2d 395 (1957).
23. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. i, 33 (Sup. Ct. 1821).
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right in the soil of the navigable rivers in the state;24 rather, those
navigable waterways, defined as where the tide ebbs and flows, re-
mained property in common to all people of New Jersey. 5 Chief
Justice Kirkpatrick noted that it was not entirely certain how the
King himself had acquired any right to this country, although the
court remarked that he could have obtained it through treaties, right
of conquest, 26 or right of discovery.27
The lineage of the trust doctrine is a question of importance
more to historical scholars than to practicing lawyers. The adoption
of the public trust doctrine fit the needs of a growing democratic
nation which sought to develop its economic resources by broadening
individual opportunities. In Arnold v. Mundy, Chief Justice Kirkpat-
rick stated:
[T]he sovereign power ... cannot consistently with the
principles of the law of nature and the constitution of a well-
ordered society, make a direct and absolute grant of the waters
of the state, divesting all citizens of their common right. It
would be a grievance which never could be long borne by a free
people.
28
The foundation of the public trust doctrine in America-rests both on
pragmatic principles of resource management and upon ancient com-
mon law traditions. Modern application of the doctrine, however, has
been shaped more by contemporary practical concerns than by hoary
notions culled from the Magna Carta.
It is important to note which waters are public and which are
capable of being privately owned. Although in most states the public
trust encompasses all navigable waterways,2 9 whether tidal or non-
24. Id. at 34.
25. Id. at 78.
26. Id. at 18.
27. Entirely lost in this discussion of property rights in the New World are its original
inhabitants, the Indians. Court have dealt with this issue rather summarily. For example:
Whatever we may think of the moral quality of the principle, it has long
been established that the Indians had only a possessory right to the lands they
occupied. They were mere temporary occupants of the soil and the absolute
rights of property and dominion belonged to the European nation which first
discovered the particular portion of this country where the Indian lands were
located.
Schultz v. Wilson, 44 N.J. Super. 591, 594, 131 A.2d 415, 419 (1957), cert. denied 24 N.J.
546, 133 A.2d 395 (1957).
28. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. I, 78 (Sup. Ct. 1821).
29. In Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
claimed the Susquehanna River for the Commonwealth, even though it was not a tidal river.
This was extended by the Pennsylvania court in Shrunk v. Schuykill Navigation Co., 14 Serg.
& Rawle 71 (Pa. 1826), when most of the Commonwealth's other rivers were claimed by the
state. By the law of Pennsylvania, however, the owner of lands bounded by navigable waters
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tidal, New Jersey courts have limited the states claimed ownership
to tidal waters. In Cobb v. Davenport,0 a case which concerned the
ownership of a fresh water lake, the court held:
[T]he test by which to determine whether waters are public
or private is the ebb and flow of the tide. Waters in which the
tide ebbs and flows - so far only as the sea flows and reflows,
are public waters, and those in which there is no ebb and flow of
the tide, are private waters. 1
In addition to following English common law, which also limited
navigable waters to those waters in which there was a tidal flow,
3 2
the New Jersey court saw further advantage in the uniformity, cer-
tainty, and ease of application in the rule.33 The court declared that
to hold all waterways which were navigable in fact to be navigable at
law would invite the formulation of an arbitrary rule which would
only serve to complicate property rights on inland non-tidal
waterways. "
The public trust doctrine was first incorporated at the federal
level through Martin v. Waddell's Lessee,35 in which the Supreme
Court upheld a New Jersey state court ruling that the state could
hold title to navigable waters and the soil beneath them. In Martin,
Waddell's lessee held the rights to a plot of land in New Jersey as a
grantee of Charles II, and he brought an action for ejectment
against Martin to recover a tidewater fishery.3 6 Martin alleged that
exclusive fishing rights were granted to him by an act of legisla-
ture.3 1 The court held, as did the Arnold court on which Martin is
loosely based, that as a result of the American Revolution, the citi-
zens of the various states had taken all rights respecting tidal waters
which had theretofore vested in the crown.8 8 The majority opinion,
penned by Chief Justice Taney, was unremarkable and substantially
similar to Arnold in its style and substance. More interesting was the
has title in the soil between the high and low water marks, subject, of course, to the public
right to navigation. Wall v. Pittsburgh Harbor Co., 152 Pa. 427, 25 A. 647 (1892); Philadel-
phia v. Scott, 81 Pa. 80, 86 (1876); Wainwright v. McCullough, 63 Pa. 66, 74 (1870);
Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. 21, 30 (1869).
30. 32 N.J.L. 369 (Sup. Ct. 1867).
31, Id. at 378.
32. Selvin, The Public Trust Doctrine in American Law and Economic Policy: 1789-
1920, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 1403, 1406.
33. Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369, 380 (Sup. Ct. 1867).
34. Id. at 380.
35. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
36. Id. at 378.
37. Id. at 396.
38. Id. at 410-11, 416-17. See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. I (Sup. Ct. 1821).
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dissenting opinion39 by Judge Thompson, in which he questioned the
appropriateness of validating a statute granting an exclusive fishery
when the avowed intent of vesting property rights to tidal lands in
the state is to benefit all citizens of New Jersey.40 The extent to
which a legislature may abridge or modify public trust areas was of
crucial importance, and this question has never been completely re-
solved. Thompson's dissent recognized this central problem:
If it was a trust estate . . . and the land became as inalien-
able in the government of New Jersey as in the hands of the
king, and the state must be bound to hold all such lands subject
to the trust . . . there certainly can be no power in the state,
without a breach of trust, to deprive the citizens of New Jersey
of such common right."'
The Supreme Court affirmed its commitment to allowing the
states to control tidal land in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan.2 This case
held that the shores of Alabama's navigable waters, and the soils
under them, were not granted by the Constitution to the United
States, but were reserved to the state, and that upon admission to
the Union title to all tidal lands passed to the state. 3 Moreover,
where no state yet existed, the federal government was said to hold
the property for the future state.
The most influential exposition of the public trust doctrine on
the federal level was Illinois v. Illinois Central Railroad.45 This de-
cision was in direct contradiction of the earlier Hoboken v. Pennsyl-
vania Railroad4 decision in which the Supreme Court held that the
State of New Jersey could sell tidal lands because the legislature had
"absolute and exclusive dominion including the right to appropriate
them to such uses as might best serve its views of the public interest,
subject to the power conferred by the Constitution upon Congress to
regulate foreign and interstate commerce. ' '4 7 In Illinois Central, the
Illinois legislature in 1869 had granted to the Illinois Central Rail-
road "all the right and title . . . to the submerged lands constituting
the bed of Lake Michigan . . . for the distance of one mile."4 8 The
39. Id. at 418 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 420 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 432-33 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
42. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
43. Id. at 230.
44. Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 65 (1845).
45. 146 U.S. 387 (1892); accord Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
46. 124 U.S. 656 (1888).
47. Id. at 688.
48. Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. 387, 389 (1892).
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court disallowed this contract to convey the riparian land on the the-
ory that: "[T]he control of the state for the purpose of the trust can
never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the
interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any
substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters
remaining. '4 9 In both the Illinois Central and the Hoboken deci-
sions, there was tension between free legislative discretion in the
alienation of public trust lands and strict trust doctrine. There can
be no question that the holding in Illinois Central made the control
of public trust land a much stricter obligation. The Court limited the
discretion of the state to dispose of trust property. "The state can no
more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are
interested . . . than it can abdicate its police power." 50
III. The Public Trust and Land Ownership in New Jersey
A. Background
The application of the public trust doctrine in New Jersey, first
enunciated in Arnold, has varied through the years. Gough v. Bell"
was an early case that used the Arnold logic to uphold a public trust
in tidal lands. Gough was noteworthy because it affirmed the com-
mon law custom that allowed the owners of lands along the shore to
extend filling and wharves up to the low water mark as long as they
did not interfere with the public easement for navigation. 52 The leg-
islature of New Jersey gave statutory approval to such practices with
the Wharf Act of 1851. 8 The Wharf Act authorized counties to li-
cense riparian owners to construct wharves in tidal waters. The legis-
lature modified the Act in 1869 to exclude certain waterways, 54 and
in 1891 the Wharf Act was repealed entirely.55 This legislation rep-
resented an early attempt by the state to encourage private improve-
ments in tidal areas, and it is significant because it shows that the
legislature has, in the past, condoned the taking of riparian land
49. Id. at 453.
50. Id.
51. 21 N.J.L. 156 (Sup. Ct. 1847). Baker v. Normanoch Ass'n, Inc., 25 N.J. 407, 136
A.2d 645 (1957); Baily v. Driscoll, 19 N.J. 307, 117 A.2d 265 (1955); Cobb v. Davenport, 32
N.J.L. 369 (Sup. Ct. 1867); Ross v. Mayor of Edgewater, 115 N.J.L. 477, 184 A. 866 (Super.
Ct. 1934), aff'd, 116 N.J.L. 447, 184 A. 810 (Sup. Ct. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 543
(1936).
52. Gough, 21 N.J.L. at 160. See also Ross v. Mayor of Edgewater, 115 N.J.L. 477,
180 A. 866 (Super. Ct. 1934), aff'd, 116 N.J.L. 447, 184 A. 810 (Sup. Ct. 1936), cert. denied,
299 U.S. 543 (1936).
53. "Wharf Act," 1851 N.J. Laws 335-38.
54. 1869 N.J. Laws 1017-34, ch. 383, § 3.
55. 1891 N.J. Laws 216-18, ch. 124.
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under certain circumstances.
Twentieth-century cases applying the public trust doctrine in
New Jersey reveal ambivalence toward the question of how much
discretion the legislature has to dispose of tidal lands. In LeCompte
v. State,5 a landowner applied to the state for the purchase of ripa-
rian tidelands. The state refused to sell on terms that satisfied the
purchaser, and the purchaser sought to compel the state to convey
the tidelands. The court held that the "State is under no obligation
to convey riparian lands when requested to do so, but may, if it sees
fit, simply continue to retain title."' 57 The purchaser in LeCompte
also was asked to pay a use and occupancy assessment for his en-
croachment on the land prior to his request to buy the land from the
state. The court upheld the assessment, noting that the state had
broad power to determine the compensation for a grant of riparian
lands." LeCompte also provided a clue as to what might happen if
the state refused to sell a piece of land. In such a case, the state
would be free to press its claims for damages for trespass and for
restoration of the property to its earlier condition.5
The twentieth century has seen an extension of the public trust
doctrine to beach access cases. In Borough of Neptune City v. Avon-
by-the-Sea,60 the municipality of Avon-by-the-Sea, in order to de-
fray beach maintenance costs, began charging admission for access
to the beach, with non-residents paying a substantially higher fee
than residents. The court upheld the community's right to charge for
access to the beach, but used the public trust doctrine to strike down
the two-tier fee structure. In so holding, the court extended the pub-
lic trust doctrine to protect recreational use of the shoreline. "[The
doctrine] is not limited to the ancient prerogatives of navigation and
fishing but extend[s] as well to recreational uses, including bathing,
swimming and other shore activities."61 New Jersey was not alone in
this extension of the trust doctrine. The Supreme Court of California
had done the same in Mark v. Whitney 2 in response to similar cir-
56. 65 N.J. 447, 323 A.2d 481 (1974).
57. Id. at 451, 323 A.2d at 483.
58. Id. at 452, 323 A.2d at 484.
59. Id. at 452-53, 323 A.2d at 484.
60. 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972).
61. Id. at 301, 294 A.2d at 50.
62. 6 Cal.3d 251, 492 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971). It is hardly surprising that
the other state with a significant corpus of public trust law is California, with its 1500 miles of
coastline and 4200 miles of navigable rivers shoreline. California radically changed the face of
its public trust doctrine in 1981. In that year, the state supreme court added non-tidal naviga-
ble waters to its public trust domain. State of California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 29 Cal.3d
210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1981). The court also decided that the state's failure
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cumstances on the Pacific coast.
Neptune City is also significant because it held that when the
legislature grants land, the grant is "impliedly impressed with cer-
tain obligations on the grantee to use the conveyed lands only con-
sistently with the public rights therein.""3 This is a dramatic depar-
ture from an earlier New Jersey case which held that the
"Legislature has the power, absolute and unlimited, to regulate,
abridge or vacate public rights in tidal waters except in the field
reserved to Congress by the Federal Constitution. "64
This aspect of the public trust doctrine as applied in New Jersey
merits attention because it is especially germane to the problem of
coastal property ownership, that is, the extent to which the legisla-
ture may convey public trust lands to private parties. It has been
held that the state may grant rights in tidal areas when the grant
will further a goal of the doctrine, such as the improvement of com-
merce benefitting the public.6 5 Many New Jersey Supreme Court
cases, however, have liberally construed the state's power to convey
tidal land. A careful reading of the statutes 6 dealing with the con-
veyance of tide lands reveals no significant limitations on the legisla-
ture's power to sell land. Furthermore, in Stevens v. Patterson &
Newark Railroad,67 the Court of Errors and Appeals held that it
was within legislative discretion to grant lands on the shore of a tidal
river below the high water mark to be used in such a way as to block
the access of the riparian owner from his land to the water. 8 The
to assert an interest in shore zones for over a hundred years did not give rise to an estoppel,
due to strong public policy in this area. State of California v. Superior Court (Fogerty), 29
Cal.3d 240, 625 P.2d 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1981). The California doctrine had already
been expanded to include recreational and ecological uses in Mark v. Whitney, 6 Cal.3d 251,
492 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971). See generally Taylor, Patented Tidelands: A Naked
Fee? Mark v. Whitney and The Public Trust Easement, 47 CALIF. ST. B.J. 420 (1972) (discus-
sion of the first case to declare recreation to be a valid public trust right). Also of interest is
Justice Clark's dissent in Fogerty, in which he asserted that imposition of the trust at this late
date constituted a constitutionally impermissible taking. He further asserted that the public
trust was only meant to protect commerce and navigation, and that the majority had misread
the precedent of Illinois Central. State of California v. Superior Court (Fogerty), 29 Cal.3d
210, 228, 625 P.2d 256, 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713, 719-20 (1981) (Clark, J., dissenting). See
also Stevens, Life, Liberty, and the Right to Navigate: Justice Mosk and The Public Trust,
12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 421 (1985); Comment, Lyon and Fogerty: Unprecedented Exten-
sions of the Public Trust, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 113 (1982).
63. Borough of Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 308, 294 A.2d 47, 54
(1972).
64. Schultz v. Wilson, 44 N.J. Super. 591, 597, 131 A.2d 415, 418-19 (App. Div. 1957),
cert. denied, 24 N.J. 546, 133 A.2d 395 (1957).
65. Borough of Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 307, 294 A.2d 47, 67
(1972).
66. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12:3-1 et seq.
67. 34 N.J.L. 532 (Sup. Ct. 1870).
68. Id. at 549-52.
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implication in Stevens was that the legislature has broad discretion
to convey lands. This approach was followed in Schultz v. Wilson."
This expansive interpretation of the legislature's ability to dispose of
tidelands must be qualified by the holding of the Supreme Court in
Illinois Central that the state may not completely abdicate its re-
sponsibility to hold tidal land in public trust." The extent of legisla-
tive power to convey tidelands is of paramount importance because it
determines how much latitude the legislature could have in affording
relief to those property owners whose land is threatened by state
claims.
The dilemma occurring today in coastal property ownership
stems not from the public trust doctrine per se, but rather from the
state's claim that its lands include both those which are affected by
existing tides, and also land which was "formerly tide-flowed. '7 1 For
the purposes of New Jersey law, such lands include all property that
has been submerged since the date of colonization, 1664, when King
Charles II granted what was to become New Jersey to the Duke of
York.
As coastal boundaries change, so may ownership rights. Thus, it
is of crucial importance to understand how certain changes can af-
fect title. Natural changes such as accretion, reliction, and erosion
72
do not present any problems. It is settled law that accretion, which
creates new land by depositing sediment on old lands, is property of
the abutting land owner;7 8 erosion takes property away from the land
owner. 74 It is artificial changes such as landfills, jetties, and dredging
which create the intractable problems of proof. Because neither the
riparian land owner nor the state is able to acquire land by artificial
69. 44 N.J. Super. 591, 131 A.2d 415 (App. Div. 1957), cert. denied, 24 N.J. 546, 133
A.2d 395 (1957).
70. Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
71. State v. Council of the Div. of Resource Dev., No. L-12561-68, slip op. at 3 (N.J.
Super. Ct., Law Div.) (Sept. 8, 1971).
72. Accretion is the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of material called alluvion
which extends a shoreline. Reliction is the gradual withdrawal of water from the land by the
lowering of its surface level. Erosion is the gradual and imperceptible wearing away of land.
Garret v. State, I 18 N.J. Super. 594, 600, 289 A.2d 542, 547 (Ch. Div. 1972) (quoting Noyes
v. Collins, 92 Iowa 566, 61 N.W. 250 (1894)). A change, whether loss or addition, when
sudden and perceptible as from a flood or a hurricane is known as avulsion. Garret v. State,
118 N.J. Super. 594, 601, 289 A.2d 542, 546 (Ch. Div. 1972). The general rule is that in
order to gain land the accretion or reliction must be gradual and imperceptible. In the case of
avulsion, the ownership of the land will not be changed. Id. See also Noyes v. Collins, 92 Iowa
566, 612 N.W. 250 (1894); Housing Auth. v. State, 193 N.J. Super. 176, 472 A.2d 612 (App.
Div. 1984); Gormley v. Lan, 181 N.J. Super. 7, 436 A.2d 535 (App. Div. 1981).
73. Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Masciarella, 92 N.J. Super. 53, 222 A.2d 138 (Ch.
Div. 1966), affd, 51 N.J. 352, 240 A.2d 665 (1968).
74. Id. at 60, 222 A.2d at 142.
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works 75 it is necessary to determine where the mean high tide line
was prior to the artificial change to ascertain the true owner of the
property.76 For example, if construction of a jetty creates an obstruc-
tion in the water course, accretion may be accelerated. To the extent
that such a change in the status of the land is the result of the jetty,
it has no effect on title to the land." Because of the difficulty in
determining the effect of artificial changes on the coastal boundaries,
and because the average title search investigates only the past sixty
years of ownership, many homeowners never discover that there may
be a state claim to their property based on old tidal flows. Even if
the property were found to have been once under water, most people,
including real estate professionals and lawyers, would consider it un-
likely that the state would ever assert ownership.
78
B. O'Neill - Order Out of Chaos?
The fuse to this latent time bomb was lit by the 1967 New
Jersey Supreme Court decision in O'Neill v. State Highway Depart-
nent.79 O'Neill involved the ownership of lands along the Hacken-
sack River in East Rutherford, New Jersey. The state claimed the
land as its property, but the trial court held that the state was es-
topped from asserting its claim. 80 On appeal, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court reversed and in so doing laid down specific rules re-
garding state claims in tidelands. The court first declared that
neither estoppel nor laches is applied against the state to the same
extent as against private parties. 1 Moreover, it has been settled in
75. O'Neill v. State Highway Dep't, 50 N.J. 307, 324, 235 A.2d 1, 10 (1967). But see
Gormley v. Lan, 181 N.J. Super. 57, 436 A.2d 535 (App. Div. 1981) (holding that a gradual
and imperceptible accretion can increase ownership of the abutting landowner even if the prod-
uct of an artificial structure, at least if the landowner did not build it himself and it was not
built by the state in aid of navigation or shore protection). There may be as much as 244,000
acres of tidelands in New Jersey that have been affected by artificial structures. Porro and
Teleky, Marshland Title Dilemma: A Tidal Phenomenon, 3 SETON HALL 323, 331 (1972).
See also Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Masciarella, 51 N.J. 352, 359-61, 240 A.2d 665, 668-
70 (1968) (discussion of accretion or reliction that occurs in connection with artificial
structures).
76. O'Neill v. State Highway Dep't., 50 N.J. 307, 235 A.2d 1 (1967).
77. Id. at 319, 235 A.2d at 10.
78. "It really wasn't taken seriously - there's no question about that," says Joseph
Clayton, Jr., an expert in New Jersey riparian law. Phila. Inquirer, Oct. 5, 1986, at 10A, col.
4.
79. 50 N.J. 307, 235 A.2d I (1967).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 319, 235 A.2d at 7. See also Abbott v. Beth Israel Cemetery Ass'n of Wood-
bridge, 13 N.J. 528, 100 A.2d 532 (1953); State v. Erie R.R. Co., 23 N.J. Misc. 203, 42 A.2d
759 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Schultz v. Wilson, 44 N.J. Super. 591, 131 A.2d 415, cert. denied, 24
N.J. 546, 133 A.2d 395 (1957); 28 AM. JR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 123 (1972), Annot., I
A.L.R. 20, 338, 344 (1948).
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New Jersey that the state's title in tidelands cannot be lost by ad-
verse possession or prescription.8" The court in O'Neill also refused
to bar state claims to tidelands because of state inaction" and re-
jected the idea that the tidelands were part of a lost grant. 8 It is
apparent that what the court accomplished in O'Neill was to prevent
land owners from asserting any doctrine that could strip the state of
its title to submerged and formerly submerged lands. The court di-
rectly faced the issue of whether state failure to exert dominion over
its holdings or to give public notice of the rights it claims could
divest it of its title in favor of a bona fide purchaser. The court held
that it would be a gross violation of the public trust to make the
state's ownership contingent upon exercise of dominion or provision
of notice.85 This holding was destined to cause great distress among
riparian landowners subject to state claims.
The O'Neill court did fashion two provisions designed to restore
some hope to riparian property holders. First, the court assigned the
burden of proving whether the tidelands status of the property had
been changed by artificial measures to the party who is challenging
the existing classification. 8 This is logical because it would be unfair
to place on the current owner the burden of proving that the status
of the property remains unaltered. 7 In most cases, the state must
carry the burden of persuasion with respect to the impact of artificial
changes on tidal lands. Second, in order to create some frame of
reference in dealing with shore claims, the court urged that "[als a
matter of good housekeeping, the appropriate officers of the State
should do what is feasible to catalogue the State's far-flung
holdings." '
82. O'Neill v. State Highway Dep't, 50 N.J. at 320, 235 A.2d at 8. See also Quinlan v.
Borough of Fair Haven, 102 N.J.L. 443, 131 A. 870 (Sup. Ct. 1926); State v. Maas & Wald-
stein, 83 N.J. Super. 211, 199 A.2d 248 (App. Div. 1964); Annot., 55 A.L.R.2d 554 (1957).
83. O'Neill v. State Highway Dep't, 50 N.J. at 321, 235 A.2d at 8. See also United
States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 39; Beaver v. United States, 35 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1965), cerl.
denied, 383 U.S. 937 (1965).
84. The lost grant theory is based on a fiction that the land was conveyed by a missing
deed. Juries and judges may find this fictitious deed of grant even when the presumption is
known to be a mere fiction. RAPULE AND LAWRENCE LAW DICTIONARY 774 (1888). In
O'Neill, the court dismissed this notion by finding that "there is nothing to warrant a finding
or assumption that the State likely conveyed its title by an instrument which cannot be found."
O'Neill, 50 N.J. at 321, 235 A.2d at 8.
85. O'Neill, 50 N.J. at 320, 235 A.2d at 8.
86. Id. at 326-27, 235 A.2d at 11.
87. Id. at 327, 235 A.2d at 11.
88. Id. at 320, 235 A.2d at 8.
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C. Post-O'Neill Developments
The state legislature acted promptly on the court's housekeeping
suggestion and mandated89 that the Natural Resource Council per-
form surveys of meadowlands 0 to ascertain which property belonged
to the state. Of course, this mapping effectively shifts the burden
back to the landowner to rebut the presumptions established by the
maps. The mapping was begun in 1970 to determine the high-water
mark91 of all lands on the New Jersey coastline. Ideally, this map-
ping process would have led to an orderly cataloging of state claims
and a quick resolution to shoreland property problems. Not surpris-
ingly, however, land owners whose land was threatened by state
claims sought to prevent the maps from becoming official. 2 Long
delays ensued during the preparation of the maps, in part due to
89. "The council shall make progress reports to the Governor and Legislature at least
annually and shall complete its studies and title surveys and make its determinations as to
interest of the State in meadowlands throughout the State on or before December 31, 1980."
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1B-13.6 (West 1968).
90.
(a) "Meadowlands" means those lands, now or formerly consisting chiefly
of salt water swamps, meadows, or marshes.
(b) "Improved meadowlands" means such meadowlands as have been re-
claimed by fill or other materials thereon, and may include the erection of
structure.
(c) "Virgin meadowlands" means such meadowlands that are still in their
natural state and upon which no diking, fill or structures have been placed.
(d) "Council" means the Resources Department Council of the Department
of Conservation and Economic Development.
The department of conservation and economic development was reorga-
nized. continued and designated as the department of environmental protection,
see § 13.-ID-i.
The resource development council is continued as the natural resources
council in the department of environmental protection, § 13:ID-3.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1B-13.1 (West 1968) (emphasis in original). Although Title 13 required
that the state map only the above-defined meadowlands, the state decided to investigate all
tidal property in which it might have an interest. Dickinson v. Fund for the Support of Free
Pub. Schools, 95 N.J. 65, 460 A.2d 691 (1983).
91. To the Romans, the coastline meant the high water mark of the highest winter flood,
not merely the mean high-water mark. JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES 2.1.3. In American jurisdictions,
the high-water mark is "the line formed by the intersection of the tidal plane of mean high
tide with the shore," with the mean high tide defined as the medium between the spring and
neap tides. O'Neill v. State Highway Dep't, 50 N.J. 307, 323, 235 A.2d 1, 9 (1967). See also,
Velsico Chem. Corp. v. State Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 182 N.J. Super. 575, 442 A.2d 1051
(App. Div. 1982); N.J. Zinc & Iron Co. v. Morris Canal and Banking Co., 44 N.J. Eq. 398,
400 (Ch. 1888), aff'd 47 N.J. Eq. 598 (Sup. Ct. 1890). It is further recommended, for the
sake of accuracy, to measure the mean of all high tides over a period of 18.6 years because this
period is recognized as being a complete tidal cycle, wherein all non-periodic variations will be
assumed to balance out. I SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES, 87 n. 16 (1962). See
Borax Consol. Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 26-27 (1935).
92. Originally intended to be completed by 1974, the mapping process is now scheduled
to be finished by the spring of 1987. Since the Tidelands Council adopted and published the
first set of maps in 1982, over 1400 maps have been completed. Each map depicts 1.5 square
miles of coastline. Phila. Inquirer, Oct. 5, 1986, at 10A, col. 2.
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litigation over the mapping techniques used by the state.9 In this
series of lawsuits, various individuals and title insurance companies
sought to overturn maps on grounds that the cartographic methodol-
ogy9'4 used was inconsistent with the methodology prescribed by stat-
ute.95 Ultimately, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the map-
ping rules allowed broad discretion, and so the Natural Resource
Council could use any historical or scientific" data it found rele-
vant.97 Thus, a mapping based on the novel technique of biological
delineation was deemed a reasonable implementation of the duty
mandated by statute, and the controversy over the mapping proce-
dure concluded after nearly a decade in the courts.
Undaunted by their failure to exclude the maps, opponents of
strict application of the public trust doctrine worked to achieve pas-
sage of an amendment to the New Jersey Constitution. 8 An attempt
93. See State v. Council for Division of Natural Resources Dev., 60 N.J. 199, 287 A.2d
713 (1972) (first set of maps suppressed as not having been prepared in accordance with legis-
lative directions). See also City of Newark v. Natural Resource Council, 133 N.J. Super. 245,
336 A.2d 46 (Law Div. 1974), aff'd, 148 N.J. Super. 297, 372 A.2d 644 (App. Div. 1974),
cert. granted and matter summarily remanded for clarification of opinion, 75 N.J. 32, 379
A.2d 262 (1977), clarified and aff'd, 82 N.J. 530, 414 A.2d 1304 (1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 983 (1980) (an example of an intensely litigated and convoluted battle over the legality
of the Tideland Council's maps).
94. The technique employed by the Natural Resource Council in mapping the New
Jersey coastline used biological delineation instead of traditional tide-gauging and surveying.
Biological delineation relies on color infrared aerial photographs to determine the spectral re-
flectance patterns of tidal grass. There is allegedly a correlation between the concentration of
tidal plants and the degree of inundation in that area. Opponents of the mapping program
alleged that such a novel technique was in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:IB-13.3 (West
1968) which outlines the factors to be taken into account in mapping. See infra note 95 and
accompanying text. See also City of Newark v. Natural Resource Council, 82 N.J. 530, 535,
414 A.2d 1304, 1309 (1980) (a discussion of the spectral reflectance method of coastal map-
ping); Porro and Teleky, Marshland Title Dilemma: A Tidal Phenomenon, 3 SETON HALL
323, 332 (1972) (an enchanting summary of marshland biota and its significance to
cartographers).
95.
In making a thorough study of all such lands to determine which are State-
owned lands and in making its determination the council shall take into account
the mean high water line as established by the United States Coast and Geo-
detic Survey, the nature of the vegetation thereon, artificial changes in land or
water elevation, and such other historical or scientific data which, in the opinion
of the council, are relevant in determining whether a parcel of land is now or
was formerly flowed by mean high tide.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1B-13.3 (West 1968).
96. See Porro and Teleky, Marshland Title Dilemma: A Tidal Phenomenon, 3 SETON
HALL 323, 335-48 (1972) (outlines a valuation and factor percentage system for mapping;
includes such minutiae as acidity and electrical resistivity of the soil in determining the high-
water mark).
97. City of Newark v. Natural Resource Council, 82 N.J. at 540, 414 A.2d at 1314.
98.
No lands that were formerly tidal flowed, but which have not been tidal
flowed at any time for a period of 40 years, shall be deemed riparian lands, or
lands subject to a riparian claim, and the passage of that period shall be a good
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in the early 1970's to pass an amendment to turn the tidelands over
to private interests had failed.99 This time a more narrowly worded
amendment was offered to the people. It was passed in the general
election of 1981. The amendment provided that the state must spe-
cifically define and assert its claims to land that had not been tidally
flowed for a period of more than forty years. 10 The amendment af-
forded the state an additional one year period to define its claims in
tidelands that had not been flowed for forty or more years prior to
November 3, 1981.101 Although the amendment sought to resolve
ownership of tidal lands, and may have seemed unobjectionable on
its face, two important considerations militated against its adoption.
First, at the time the amendment was passed in 1981, only thirty-
four percent of coastal mapping had been completed because of
lengthy litigation, the occasional absence of funds, and internal fight-
ing within the Department of Environmental Protection. 0 2 Since
there was no way that the remaining maps could be completed
within the one year period, 0" the areas of northern New Jersey al-
and sufficient bar to any such claim, unless during that period the State has
specifically defined and asserted such a claim pursuant to law. This section shall
apply to lands which have not been tidal flowed at any time during the 40 years
immediately preceding adoption of this amendment with respect to any claim
not specifically defined and asserted by the State within I year of the adoption of
this amendment.
N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 5, I. The amendment was adopted in the general election of Novem-
ber 3, 1981.
99. Jaffe, State Citizen Rights Respecting Greatwater Resources: From Rome to New
Jersey, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 571 (1971).
100. This amendment was adopted in the general election of November 3, 1981, by a
vote of 864,445 in favor to 756,220 against. Dickinson v. Fund for Support of Free Pub.
Schools, 187 N.J. Super. 224, 233, 454 A.2d 491, 496 (1982); rev'd in part and affid in part,
95 N.J. 65, 469 A.2d 1 (1983).
101. The following explanatory statement appeared on the ballot when the Amendment
was voted upon:
The primary purpose of this amendment is to relieve owners of land from
certain competing claims of ownership by the State. These claims arise from the
fact that the State may own any land that ever had the ordinary high tide
("mean" high tide) flow over it, regardless of who the record owner may be or
how long he has occupied the land. Sometimes it is difficult to determine that
fact and owners may be uncertain for years if the State has a claim to the land.
When the State establishes ownership of tidal flowed land, any proceeds
from the sale of the land are deposited in a fund devoted to public education.
This amendment provides that if the State does not, within one year, pre-
sent all claims on lands that have been "dry" for at least 40 years, those claims
are barred. The State may have claims for such land that would succeed under
present law but that may be extinguished by virtue of this amendment, if for any
reason the State does not assert such claims within one year.
Reprinted in Gormley v. Lan, 88 N.J. 26, 35 n.2, 438 A.2d 519, 524 n.2 (1981).
102. N.J. L.J., Sept. 24, 1981, at 4, col. I.
103. Id. Richard McManus, associate council to the governor, stated: "The period in
this amendment is much too brief a period for the state to complete its work." Such argument
was not unopposed. State Senator Perskie, sponsor of the amendment, declared:
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ready mapped would hold a disproportionately high percentage of
state-claimed lands.
104
The second objection to the amendment was that the New
Jersey public school fund had a legal interest in all riparian lands
which the amendment improperly impaired. By statute,105 all funds
derived from sale of riparian lands have been dedicated to the sup-
port of free public schools. When coupled with a state constitutional
provision establishing a permanent school fund and stating that "the
fund for the support of free public schools and all ...property,
which may hereafter be appropriated for that purpose . . . shall...
remain a perpetual fund," 106 this statute seemed to imply that the
tidelands are irrevocably dedicated to the Fund. A gift by the state
of riparian lands has been held unconstitutional, even where the gift
This proposed amendment ...would not have the effect of depriving the
state of any riparian claim to which the constitution entitles the state. It simply
provides a time frame within which any such claim may be defined and asserted
after a given piece of ground has ceased to be tidal flowed.
Public Hearings before Senate Judiciary Committee and Assembly Judiciary, Law, Public
Safety and Defense Committees on ACR-3037 and SCR-30231, (June 5, 1981). See also
Dickinson v. Fund for Support of Free Pub. Schools, 95 N.J. 65, 76-77, 469 A.2d 1, 11 (1983)
(brief discussion of the legislative history of Article Vii, § 5, 1).
104. N.J. L.J., Sept. 24, 198 1, at 4, col. I.
105.
All lands belonging to this State now or formerly lying under water are
dedicated to the support of public schools. All moneys hereafter received from
the sales of such lands shall be paid to the board of trustees, and shall constitute
a part of the permanent school fund of the State. To the extent that moneys
received from the sales of these lands may, by law, be made payable to any
purposes other than the school fund, these moneys shall not be paid to other
purposes so long as there is a deficiency in the school bond reserve.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:56-5 (Supp. 1986) (amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:56-5) (West
1968) (emphasis in original).
106.
The fund for the support of free public schools, and all money, stock and
other property, which may hereafter be appropriated for that purpose, or re-
ceived into the treasury under the provisions of any law heretofore passed to
augment the said fund, shall be securely invested, and remain a perpetual fund;
and the income thereof, except so much as it may be judged expedient to apply
to an increase of the capital, shall be annually appropriated to the support of
free public schools, and for the equal benefit of all the people of the State; and it
shall not be competent, except as hereinafter provided, for the Legislature to
borrow, appropriate or use the said fund or any part thereof for any other pur-
pose, under any pretense whatever. The bonds of any school district of this State,
issued according to law, shall be proper and secure investments for the said fund
and, in addition, said fund, including the income therefrom and any other mon-
eys duly appropriated to the support of free public schools may be used in such
manner as the Legislature may provide by law to secure the payment of the
principal of or interest on bonds or notes issued for school purposes by counties,
municipalities or school districts or for the payment or purchase of any such
bonds or notes or any claims for interest thereon.
N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, 2.
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was made for public purposes.0 7 The Fund clearly derived great
benefit from this arrangement. In the 1986 fiscal year, the fund real-
ized $2,400,000 to schools on gross sales of $4,300,000.11 The loss
to the fund subsequent to the adoption of this amendment has been
claimed to be several million dollars.
10 9
The new amendment"0 survived a constitutional attack brought
on the grounds that the amendment deprived the Fund of its interest
in tidelands without compensation in violation of the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States
Constitution."' The Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected this con-
tention in Dickinson v. Fund for Support of Free Public Schools,'
and held that the Fund was a creation of the people and was subject
to their will to modify, or even eliminate it." 3 The court also ad-
dressed the contention that the amendment violated the Equal Pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment because some riparian
landowners were forced to pay to retain their land, while other simi-
larly situated owners might keep their land without payment because
of the state's inability to map all of its claims within a year."" The
court quickly dismissed this argument, however, applying a low stan-
dard of review and concluding that the goal of eliminating uncertain-
ties of title was legitimate justification for terminating state claims
after forty years."'
The tidelands amendment achieves only a partial resolution of
107. Garrett v. State, 118 N.J. Super. 594, 289 A.2d 542 (Ch. 1972).
108. Phila. Inquirer, Oct. 5, 1986, at 10A, col. 5.
109. N.J. L.J., Sept. 24, 1981 at 4, cal. 1.
110. Opponents of the amendment also argued that the amendment violated the clause
of the United States Constitution which provides that "No State shall ... pass any ... Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I. To support this
argument, they pointed to the New Jersey School Bond Reserve Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §
18A:56-17 to -20 (Supp. 1986). The Bond Reserve Act created a reserve of one and one half
percent of the total outstanding bonded debt issued for school purposes, but this was not to
exceed the total money available in the Fund. The argument was that any reduction in the
state's ability to convey riparian lands adversely affected the securing of the bonds. The court
dismissed this argument by holding that: the impact of the amendment on the bonds was
speculative; the amendment violated no specific terms of the bond contract; the legislature
could appropriate more money to the fund if additional security were needed; the Fund might
be increased by funds other than sales of riparian lands; and the one and one half percent
reserve would not be diminished until the bonds are satisfied. It was estimated that between
1976 and 1981 the annual amount received by the fund from the conveyance of riparian lands
was approximately $2,000,000. Dickinson v. Fund for Support of Free Pub. Schools, 95 N.J.
65, 87-90, 469 A.2d 1, 20-22 (1983).
111. Dickinson, 95 N.J. at 87, 469 A.2d at 12.
112. 95 N.J. 65, 469 A.2d I (1983). For a thorough discussion of Dickinson, see Survey,
Constitutional Law Tidelands Amendments, 14 SETON HALL 815 (1984).
113. Dickinson, 95 N.J. at 87, 469 A.2d at 12.
114. Id. at 86, 469 A.2d at 12.
115. Id. at 87, 469 A.2d at 12.
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the tidelands property problems. Conflicts of interest still exist be-
tween landowners trying to avoid double payment for their property,
the school fund trying to hold on to its preserve, and the courts at-
tempting to support the integrity of the public trust doctrine. The
following section sets forth a proposal that addresses the problem in
such a manner as to preserve the public trust in tidal areas, protect
the legitimate interests the Fund for Support of Free Public Schools
has in the tidelands, and deliver an equitable result to coastal prop-
erty owners.
IV. Conclusion: A Proposal to Achieve Greater Fairness
The public trust doctrine has its origin in ancient Roman law
and has descended to the United States through English common
law. Through the years the doctrine has expanded, from merely pro-
tecting public rights to navigation and commerce, to protecting pub-
lic recreational and ecological rights. This evolution demonstrates
that the doctrine is neither static nor outmoded. Indeed, the trust
doctrine has admirably performed its chief goal of preserving marine
natural resources for the benefit of the public. It is desirable, there-
fore, to uphold the doctrine and to assert the state ownership of for-
merly submerged lands. Moreover, it would be contrary to Illinois
Central simply to abdicate public trust responsibilities. In New
Jersey, case law suggests that it is unconstitutional to grant riparian
lands without consideration.
In order to deliver an equitable result to homeowners who, like
Nancy Uber, were bona fide purchasers, however, some adjustment
in the doctrine must be made. It is the author's suggestion that the
state provide such an adjustment by broadening its policy toward
estoppel against the state, and by enacting legislation allowing bona
fide purchasers to pay the state only the fair market value of the
house at the time of purchase less any taxes paid by them on state-
claimed property.
A. Broadening Estoppel
The current property ownership problem in Avalon, New
Jersey, demonstrates the efficacy and desirability of using estoppel
against the state to bar tidelands claims. It has been alleged that
staff members of the Tidelands Council knew that development of
state-owned lands was occurring in Avalon, yet they neither ordered
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the work to be stopped nor warned prospective purchasers. " 6 In such
a case the state claim ought to be barred. There is some precedent
for such a position. City of Newark v. Natural Resource Council'
17
implies that if there is a showing that a state officer was aware of the
state's interest and stood by while a landowner acts in reliance
thereon, estoppel may be asserted successfully against the state.
B. Legislative Changes
Historically, the legislature has shown some inconsistency in
carrying out its duty to preserve public trust lands. The strictness of
the trust seems to vary with the value of the public resource. In the
case of the aggrieved property holders, the value of the resource they
have unknowingly infringed is usually minimal at most. These prop-
erty owners are not adversely affecting New Jersey's commercial,
navigational, recreational, or ecological well-being. The public inter-
est in their land is very weak. Therefore, the legislature ought to
provide as large a break to homeowners like Nancy Uber as is con-
stitutionally permissible. While it is unlikely that the legislature
could give away land, it certainly could order the Tidelands Council
to charge a rate that would be less burdensome. The author suggests
that bona fide purchasers of tidal lands who cannot assert estoppel
against the state should be required to pay only the fair market
value of the land at the time of their purchase, with credit for taxes
paid on state-claimed land. This approach has a certain symmetry to
it. Since the state has the temerity to impose on a property buyer
constructive knowledge of tidal patterns that the state itself obtained
only through very sophisticated mapping techniques, the buyer ought
to have the advantage of being able to pay for the land at the price
which would have prevailed if there had been actual notice at the
time of purchase. The state already provides a discount for all im-
116. Such an approach of broadening estoppel unless the state could demonstrate a
great public interest was suggested by Justice Clark in his dissent in State of California v.
Superior Court (Fogerty), 29 Cal.3d 240, 625 P.2d 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1981). This
approach would be especially helpful in a case such as that of Mr. Tito Macchia. Macchia
bought and developed 133 acres of marshland in the late 1960's. State officials reviewed Mac-
chia's application to buy the lands until 1972, at which time Macchia had already filled the
area in and built and sold homes. Although Macchia possibly knew of the outstanding claims,
it was likely that most if not all of the buyers were bona fide purchasers. Moreover, state
officials were warned on at least three separate occasions that a problem could occur. The state
officials took no action to notify purchasers or real estate agents that the state claimed title to
such land. Now the homes in this area have been selling for up to $1,000,000 each. Unless the
state can demonstrate great public interest, it should be estopped from asserting its claim. For
a detailed report of this and many other areas afflicted by state tidelands claims, see Phila.
Inquirer, Oct. 6, 1986, at IA, col. I.
117. 82 N.J. 530, 414 A.2d 1304 (1980).
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provements in the land made by homeowners. 118 The legislature
should, therefore, take these further steps to alleviate the burden on
bona fide purchasers.
Jon W. Olson
118. The Tidelands Council has the discretion to grant homeowner credits for improve-
ments which have been made in good faith by a record owner under color of title. Further-
more, the price set by the Council may be adjusted to reflect an evaluation of the state's ability
to successfully establish its claim of ownership. Att'y Gen. F.O, 1983, No. 3. This "good
faith" discount usually runs from forty percent to seventy-five percent, and has already re-
duced drastically the compensation the state has received for some property. Nancy Uber, the
homeowner who had to pay $27,000, originally was asked to pay close to $70,000. Ralph
Greico, although forced to pay $73,000, had been assessed at $95,000. If the state can see fit
to provide such discounts, then it requires only a small step, legally and logically, to arrive at a
truly equitable result by either granting the land, estopping the state's claim or allowing the
homeowner to clear his title at the price he would have paid had he been given notice of the
state's claim when he originally purchased the property.

